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Over the Counter but
Under the Radar:
Direct-to-Consumer Genetics Tests
and FDA Regulation of
Medical Devices
ABSTRACT
Direct-to-consumer genetic tests are laboratory-developed tests
that are marketed and sold directly to consumers. They typically do
not require a prescription or any other involvement from a consumer's
health care provider. Consumers order these tests online and return a
specimen, usually a saliva sample, directly to the laboratory. The
results are mailed directly to the consumer, and no health care
provider or insurance company need ever learn the contents of these
results. The FDA does not currently regulate direct-to-consumer
genetic tests, though tests for hundreds of different diseases are readily
available to the public.
The FDA's approach to regulating genetic tests is not uniform.
The FDA regulates "test kits," or genetic tests developed by a
manufacturer independent from the clinical laboratory that distributes
them, as medical devices. These test kits are not available directly to
consumers; instead, the laboratories send them to health care providers
for patient diagnosis.
Absence of FDA regulation of direct-to-consumer genetic tests
means that consumers utilize these tests without any assurance of their
reliability, accuracy, or usefulness in helping individuals make
prudent health care decisions. Furthermore, individuals often receive
their test results directly from the laboratory without any formal
genetic counseling regarding the meaning of these results, which are
often less straightforward than consumers may expect.
This Note differentiates between test kits and home brews,
identifying the hazards that direct-to-consumer genetic tests pose to the
public due to the fact that they are unregulated. It also analyzes the
FDA regulatory process that medical devices undergo in order to be
marketed and sold. Finally, the Note advocates for FDA regulation of
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direct-to-consumer genetic tests as medical devices, just as test kits are,
based on the protections that this regulatory process affords consumers.
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Notions of patient autonomy and informed consent are
paramount in clinical research in the United States.' Such ethical
1. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979),
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelinesbelmont.html [hereinafter THE BELMONT REPORT]
(requiring that researchers treat their research subjects as autonomous individuals, and
that researchers fully inform their subjects about the potential risks and benefits that stem
from participation in a particular research study). An autonomous individual is one who is
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constructs extend to general patient care, as physicians are now
discouraged from abiding by the traditional professional paradigm of
medical care, under which "professionals, as experts, make core
decisions for patients," and instead are encouraged to treat patients as
informed consumers who should actively participate in medical
decision-making. 2  As consumers become more sophisticated and
informed about their medical care, their desire to know more about
any underlying medical conditions they may have is inevitable, as this
information is vital to their ability to make educated decisions about
their care.
3
Genetic tests offer consumers a figurative crystal ball with
respect to their need for medical information. 4 Medical history can be
fairly easily obtained through inspection of medical records, but only
within the last few decades have individuals been able to obtain
information about their medical predispositions, as well as the
predispositions of their unborn children. 5 Simple methods of DNA
extraction, such as a cheek swab or blood sample, allow doctors to
diagnose an individual's current illness, future illness, or future
health risks.6 These tests also allow physicians to predict future drug
responses, as well as genetic disorders that an individual's child may
inherit.7
"capable of deliberation about personal goals and of acting under the direction of such
deliberation." Id. Informed consent may be described as a voluntary decision that an
individual makes to undergo a treatment, test, or procedure, with enough information, and
sufficient understanding of the treatment, test, or procedure to which he consented. See id.
2. James F. Blumstein, Medicine Isn't an Economics-Free Zone, WALL ST. J., June
22, 2001, at A14.
3. See Cyanne Demchak, Choice in Medical Care: When Should the Consumer
Decide?, ISSUE BRIEF, Oct. 2007, at 2, available at http://www.academyhealth.org/issues
/ConsumerDecide.pdf ("[A]rming patients with appropriate information is one important
step in getting them more involved in decisions about their health care.").
4. Editorial, Getting a Grip on Genetic Testing, NATURE MED., Feb. 2003, at 147
(noting that while genetic tests may seem like crystal balls to those who know little about
genetics, the "subtleties of genetics" are such that it is important to have a genetic
counselor help to interpret genetic test results that are likely to be more complicated than
initially thought).
5. See Nancy Press, Genetic Testing and Screening, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND
BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS,
POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 72, 72-73 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008), available at
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/Briefing-Book/genetic%20tes
ting%20chapter.pdf (explaining that modern genetic testing and counseling has been
available since the early 1970s, when prenatal testing emerged).
6. Wylie Burke, Genomic Medicine: Genetic Testing, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1867,
1867 (2002). All individuals have unique DNA, which "encodes genetic information about
living organisms." Charles J. Nerko, Note, Assessing Fourth Amendment Challenges to
DNA Extraction Statutes After Samson v. California, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 918 (2008).
7. Burke, supra note 6, at 1867.
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Genetic testing through one's family physician or through a
genetic specialist is fairly simple, often only requiring a phone call and
a visit to the physician or laboratory where a biological sample will be
taken and analyzed.8 However, the advent of science has made it
easier for those who prefer that their test results be excluded from
their medical records, or even those who dislike visiting a doctor's
office, to undergo genetic testing.9 With just a click of the mouse, a
consumer interested in learning more about his genetic composition
can place an order via the Internet for a laboratory test that will be
mailed directly to him.10 The test typically requires the consumer to
send a cheek swab back to the laboratory, and the results are then
either directly mailed to the individual, or made accessible to the
consumer on a secure website.11 No physician's visit is required, and
the test result never makes its way into the consumer's medical
record. 12
Such laboratory tests, commonly referred to in scientific
journals and in the media as direct-to-consumer genetic tests or "home
8. See Cheryl Berg & Kelly Fryer-Edwards, The Ethical Challenges of Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic Testing, 77 J. Bus. ETHICS 17, 19 (2008) (noting that a benefit of direct-
to-consumer genetic testing is that it saves the patient the fee that he would otherwise pay
for the visit during which he underwent genetic testing, as well as the laboratory fee that
the patient would incur).
9. A.J. Wolfberg, Genes on the Web - Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of Genetic
Testing, 355 NEW ENG J. MED. 543, 544 (2006) ("[Direct-to-consumer genetic testing]
provide[s] consumers who are concerned about genetic discrimination the opportunity
obtain testing and genetic counseling without the results becoming part of their medical
record."). See also Berg & Fryer-Edwards, supra note 8, at 19 (noting that direct-to-
consumer genetic tests eliminate the need to schedule a doctor's appointment as well as the
need to sit in a doctor's office waiting room with sick people).
10. See, e.g., DNA Direct, http://www.DNAdirect.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2009);
23andMe, http://www.23andme.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
11. Costs for direct-to-consumer genetic tests generally begin at several hundred
dollars but can cost one thousand dollars or more. Sarah N. Lynch, Should Genetic Tests Be
Regulated?, TIME, July 22, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article
/0,8599,1825539,00.html?xid=feed-cnn-topics. 23andMe sells genetic tests for $399 each,
and offers testing for diseases such as Parkinson's disease, diabetes, Crohn's disease.
23andMe, Health and Traits, http://www.23andme.com/health/all/ (last visited Apr. 2,
2009). The company even offers testing for lactose intolerance and resistance to HIV/AIDs,
among other conditions. Id. DNA Direct offers testing for Tay-Sachs disease, measurement
of breast and ovarian cancer risk, and for infertility, among other conditions, and the cost
for such tests varies according to the test. DNAdirect.com, Testing for Genetic Disorders,
http://www.dnadirect.com/web/article/testing-for-genetic-disorders/index (last visited Apr.
2, 2009). The cost of genetic tests undergone in a physician's office tends to fall in the same
price range, but insurance may cover some of these costs. Genetic Testing: Insight from
Mayo Clinic Specialists, http://www.mayoclinic.com/healthlgenetic-testing/CA00088 (last
visited Apr. 2, 2009).
12. DNA Direct, for example, provides a consumer with a letter that he can give at




brews," are becoming more widely utilized due to their convenience
and confidential nature. 13 With these advantages, however, come
significant disadvantages. Unlike genetic tests conducted in a
physician's office, commonly referred to as "test kits,"14 direct-to-
consumer genetic tests are not regulated by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).15 As a result, there is an increased chance of
inaccuracy or ineffectiveness in detecting genetic disorders or
conditions.' 6  Furthermore, consumers often receive the results
without any counseling regarding the interpretation of these results,
leaving an individual to interpret potentially life-changing
information on his own.'
7
Similar tests available through one's personal physician,
however, are regulated by the FDA, generally as Class II medical
devices.18 They are subject to strict standards by which the FDA
determines whether the device is sufficiently safe and effective to be
sold on the open market. 19 All approved medical devices are also
subject to some form of additional FDA oversight after they are
commercially distributed to further ensure their safety and
effectiveness.
20
13. See Berg & Fryer-Edwards, supra note 8, at 19; Wolfberg, supra note 9, at 544.
Direct-to-consumer genetic tests may also be referred to as "laboratory-developed tests"
because the laboratories that create the tests are distributing them directly to the
consumer. See infra text accompanying note 36.
14. See infra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing test kits).
15. See Stuart Hogarth, Gail A. Javitt & David Melzer, The Current Landscape for
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Legal, Ethical, and Policy Issues, 9 ANN. REV.
GENOMIcS HUM. GENETICS 161, 172-73 (2008).
16. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Classify Your Medical Device,
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/313.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) (explaining that
medical devices are regulated in such a way as to ensure their safety and efficacy for their
users, e.g., by classifying medical devices according to risk level). Thus, because direct-to-
consumer genetic tests do not undergo required external review processes prior to or after
the marketing and sale of the tests, there is, by analogy, less assurance of their safety,
accuracy, and efficacy.
17. See Douglas A. Grimm, FDA, CLIA, or a 'Reasonable Combination of Both":
Toward Increased Regulatory Oversight of Genetic Testing, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 107, 112
(2006). Although physicians who conduct genetic testing in their offices may offer some sort
of genetic counseling, some believe that only physicians who specialize in genetic disorders
or conditions are in the best position to offer counseling regarding the results of a genetic
test. Michael J. Malinowski & Robin J.R. Blatt, Commercialization of Genetic Testing
Services: The FDA, Market Forces, and Biological Tarot Cards, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1211, 1245
n.110 (1997).
18. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of
FDA classification of medical devices.
19. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Device Classes, http://www.fda.gov/CDRH
/devadvice/3132.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
20. 21 C.F.R. § 822 (2009). See also infra notes 156-160 and accompanying text for
a discussion of post-market surveillance of medical devices.
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Part I of this Note describes the types of genetic tests that are
presently available to consumers and identifies the genetic tests that
the FDA regulates. Part II discusses the issues that arise because
direct-to-consumer genetic tests are not subject to FDA regulation.
Next, Part III analyzes the classification and review process that the
FDA uses to regulate medical devices. Part IV advocates for
legislation mandating FDA review, approval, and oversight of all
genetic tests, and explores alternative means of regulating direct-to-
consumer genetic tests.
I. UNDERSTANDING GENETIC TESTS AS MEDICAL DEVICES
A. Introduction to Genetic Testing
In the late nineteenth century, Gregor Mendel studied how
physical characteristics were passed through generations of pea
plants. 21  Mendel's research is the foundation of our modern
understanding of genetics-and in particular, our understanding of
how dominant and recessive traits are inherited and manifested.
22
Mendel's research is applicable and vital today, because "[f]or better or
for worse, people . . .want to know about their genomes. The human
mind is prone to essentialism-the intuition that living things house
some hidden substance that gives them their form and determines
their powers."
23
A genetic test is "the analysis of human DNA, RNA,
chromosomes, proteins, and certain metabolites in order to detect
heritable disease-related genotypes, mutations, phenotypes, or
karyotypes for clinical purposes."24  Genetic testing is now "a
mainstream part of medical care"25 and is used to (1) diagnose genetic
diseases in newborns, children, and adults; (2) identify a genetic
disorder that has not yet presented in newborns, children, and adults;
(3) predict drug responses; and (4) assess risks to future children. 26
21. Jennifer A. Gniady, Note, Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing:
Protecting the Consumer Without Quashing a Medical Revolution, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
2429, 2433 (2008).
22. Id.
23. Steven A. Pinker, My Genome, My Self, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 11, 2008, 24, at
26.
24. Burke, supra note 6, at 1867.
25. Gail Javitt, In Search of a Coherent Framework: Options for FDA Oversight of




More than 1,600 biological tests are currently available to detect
genetic diseases or conditions.
27
B. Types of Genetic Tests
One way for an individual to undergo genetic testing is to visit
a health care provider, such as a family physician or genetic specialist,
who will obtain the necessary specimen for analysis.28 Genetic tests
that are available through a physician or other medical professional
are known as "test kits."29 The test kits include the ingredients, called
reagents, needed to perform the test, instructions for performing the
test, and information on the mutations that the test will detect. 30 The
laboratory that analyzes the specimen does not generally manufacture
the test kits itself; instead, a separate, generally unaffiliated company
manufactures the test kits that are then are sold to the laboratory. 31
Usually, a physician sends the individual's specimen to a laboratory
that analyzes the sample to determine whether the patient possesses
the genetic marker about which he is concerned. 32  Results are
reported to the physician, who then consults with the patient about
the test results.33
The FDA regulates test kits such as in vitro diagnostic devices
(IVDs).34  Thus, every aspect of the manufacturing, sale, and
monitoring of these test kits is regulated, though the level of
regulation to which these test kits are subject varies depending on the
risks associated with the particular test.35
Recently, however, clinical laboratories have begun selling
genetic testing services directly to consumers. 36  These tests are
27. GeneTests, http://www.genetests.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
28. See Amanda Ewart Toland, Genetic Health, Genetic Testing: Who Should Order
Your Genetic Test?, http://www.genetichealth.com/GT GeneticTestingWhoShould
_OrderYour_GeneticTest.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) ("In principle, any licensed
physician can order genetic tests.").
29. Gail H. Javitt & Kathy Hudson, Federal Neglect: Regulation of Genetic Testing,






35. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 800-1299 (2009). See also infra notes 91-97 and accompanying
text (describing how medical devices are classified according to their risk level).
36. See, e.g., 23andme, supra note 10; DNA Direct, supra note 10. Federal
regulations require an order from a health care provider for direct-to-consumer genetic
tests, just as for test kits. Javitt & Hudson, supra note 29, at 62. However, federal
regulations do not specify that an individual's personal health care provider must order the
test. Id. Thus, a physician affiliated with the laboratory that develops the genetic test may
2009]
VANDERBILT J OF ENT AND TECH. LAW
typically purchased over the Internet and mailed directly to the
consumer, who provides a specimen-usually a saliva sample or cheek
swab-and returns it directly to the laboratory. 37 The laboratory then
analyzes the specimen and reports the results directly to the consumer
either by mail or on a secure website. 38 No physician's visit is
required to obtain either the test or its results, which makes these
home brews very convenient for consumers. Consumers receive the
test results in the privacy of their homes and the results are not
included in a medical record nor are they reported to any insurance
companies or public health officials.3 9 However, these results may be
provided without any interpretation or formal genetic counseling. 4
0
C. FDA Regulation of Medical Devices
The FDA has indicated that it is within its statutory mandate
to regulate direct-to-consumer genetic tests, yet the agency declines to
do So. 4' The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) authorizes
order the test in lieu of the individual's own health care provider. Id. Also worth noting is
that commercial distribution of diagnostic devices directly to consumers is not new. One
commonly known test that is marketed directly to consumers for diagnosis of a medical
disease or condition is the home pregnancy test. Home pregnancy tests first became
available for commercial distribution in the mid-1970s, are sold today at most drug stores
in the United States, and are relatively inexpensive to buy, costing around $20. The Office
of NIH History, A Timeline of Pregnancy Testing, http://history.nih.gov/exhibits
/thinblueline/timeline.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009). See also CVS.com,
http://www.cvs.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) (listing various pregnancy tests for sale). Cf.
Lynch, supra note 11 (noting the cost of direct-to-consumer genetic tests). Home pregnancy
tests, unlike direct-to-consumer genetic tests, however, are regulated by the FDA as IVDs.
Gail H. Javitt, Erica Stanley & Kathy Hudson, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests,
Government Oversight, and the First Amendment: What the Government Can (and Can't)
Do to Protect the Public's Health, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 251, 271-72 (2004). The FDA approved
the first home pregnancy test in 1976. A Timeline of Pregnancy Testing, supra. In fact, the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 revised the definition of "medical device" to include
the phrase "and other conditions" to allow for FDA regulation of pregnancy tests. Elizabeth
C. Price, Does the FDA Have Authority to Regulate Human Cloning?, 11 HARVARD J. L. &
TECH. 619, 635 (1998).
37. Hogarth et al., supra note 15, at 162.
38. See Wolfberg, supra note 9, at 543-44.
39. See id. at 543.
40. See id. at 544. This means, for example, that test results may report the
presence of a gene sequence which is linked to a risk of developing a particular disease, but
the results may not indicate what the incidence of disease is with respect to that sequence.
See also Getting a Grip on Genetic Testing, supra note 4 (explaining that genetic counseling
is important because of the complexity of genetic test results).
41. Genetics & Public Policy Center, Who Regulates Genetic Tests? (May 30, 2008),
http://www.dnapolicy.org/policy.issue.php?action=detail&issuebrief-id=lO (last visited Apr.
2, 2009). In 2007, however, the FDA issued guidance addressing a subset of laboratory-
developed tests called in vitro diagnostic multivariate assays (IVDMIAs). See infra notes
170-172 and accompanying text (describing manufacturers' resistance to regulation of
[Vol. 11:3:711
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the FDA to regulate the manufacture and sale of food, drugs, and
cosmetics, and the Act has been amended numerous times to clarify
the scope of the FDA's ability to regulate.42 The FDCA defines a
medical device as "an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related
article, including any component, part or accessory which is," among
other things, "intended for use in the diagnosis of a disease or other
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, in man or other animals."43
A textualist interpretation of this definition suggests that any
type of genetic test, whether it is marketed directly to the consumer or
not, is a medical device because it is used for a defined purpose: to
diagnose or prevent a disease. 44 The FDA, however, has limited its
regulation of genetic tests as medical devices to the physician-
supervised test kits that are administered in physicians' offices.45 The
agency regulates some components that are part of the home brews,
but it does not regulate these tests as a whole.46 For example, clinical
laboratories use ingredients called analyte specific reagents (ASRs),
which are the active ingredients of a laboratory test that is used to
diagnose genetic conditions. 47 The FDA regulates "ASRs that moveo
in interstate commerce and . . . exempt[s] ASRs created in-house and
used exclusively by the same laboratory for in-house testing."48
Therefore, although the clinical laboratories are themselves subject to
IVDMIAs sold directly to consumers). Examples of IVDMIAs are tests used to detect breast
cancer, prostate cancer, heart disease, and Alzheimer's disease. Genetics & Public Policy
Center, FDA Regulation of Genetic Tests (July 27, 2006),
http://www.dnapolicy.org/policy.issue.php?action=detail&issuebriefid=l1. A very small
number, if any, of these IVDMIAs will be sold directly to consumers. Hogarth et al., supra
note 15, at 173.
42. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2009).
43. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2).
44. Id.
45. Hogarth et al., supra note 15, at 172. See infra notes 169 & 172 and
accompanying text (explaining that despite this definition, some opponents of FDA
regulation of direct-to-consumer genetic testing argue that such testing is in fact a service
and not a medical device, and thus not within the FDA's jurisdiction to regulate).
46. The fact that the FDA regulates some of the components of direct-to-consumer
genetic tests, e.g., analyte specific reagents, see infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text,
could serve as a compelling argument for FDA regulation of the tests as a whole.
47. Testimony on Technological Developments in Genetic Testing Before the
Subcomm. on Tech. of the H. Comm. on Science, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Mary K.
Pendergast, Deputy Comm'r and Senior Advisor to the Comm'r, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t960917c.html.
48. Gregorio M. Garcia, The FDA and Regulation of Genetic Tests: Building
Confidence and Promoting Safety, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 217, 227 (2008).
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regulation, 49 even if the components of the tests are sold through
interstate commerce, the FDA does not regulate the test as a whole.
Furthermore, the "corresponding in-house genetic tests" are exempt
from regulation, 50 which means that laboratory-made ASRs that do
not move in interstate commerce, along with the direct-to-consumer
tests as a whole escape FDA regulation. 51
II. THE IMPACT OF THE LACK OF REGULATION OF
DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTS
A. Effect on Clinical Validity, Clinical Utility, and Analytic Validity
Absence of any regulation means that consumers utilize home
brew tests without any assurance of their clinical validity, clinical
utility, or analytic validity.52 The sensitive nature of the DNA sample
and the test results mean that these assurances with respect to
genetic tests are essential for maintaining public health.
B. Concerns Related to Genetic Counseling
However, even if the home brew's test results are accurate,
many companies that sell these tests do not offer counseling to explain
the meaning of the results to consumers who have undergone
testing. 53 The psychological impact of genetic test results may be
extreme, particularly if the test results reveal unfavorable information
to the consumer.5 4 Many conditions or disorders that genetic tests
identify, such as Huntington's disease, Gaucher's disease, and
Alzheimer's disease, are incurable or offer limited treatment options.
55
49. See infra text accompanying notes 174-188 (discussing the regulations to which
clinical laboratories are subject).
50. Garcia, supra note 48, at 227.
51. Id.
52. Javitt & Hudson, supra note 29, at 61. Analytic validity is defined as "the
accuracy with which a particular genetic characteristic - such as a DNA sequence variant,
chromosomal deletion or biochemical indicator - can be identified in a given laboratory
test." Wylie Burke & Ron L. Zimmern, Ensuring the Appropriate Use of Genetic Tests, 5
NATURE REVS.: GENETICS 955, 958 (2004). Clinical validity is defined as "the accuracy with
which a test identifies or predicts a patient's clinical status." Id. Clinical utility is defined
as "the risks and benefits resulting from test use." Id.
53. Grimm, supra note 17, at 111-12.
54. See Alexander van Voorhees, Note, Truth in Testing Laws: A Shot in the Arm
for Designer Genes, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 797, 804 (2006).
55. Gniady, supra note 21, at 2431. Huntington's disease is a genetic, neurological
disorder that causes progressively "frequent, irregular, sudden jerks and movements of any
of the limbs or trunk," faulty speech, and an impaired memory. 2 HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES
[Vol. 11:3:711
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Receiving a diagnosis of an incurable disease will likely change an
individual's perception of himself, his life, and how he plans to spend
his remaining time.56 Without a physician interpreting the test
results, individuals may easily misunderstand the results of a home
brew test.5 7 In serious cases, individuals may interpret a test result
as indicative of certain death, which could lead to "severe
psychological trauma and [possibly] suicide."8 These extreme
consequences might otherwise be avoided with a physician's
counseling.
C. Knowledge is Not Always Power
Additionally, individuals may go to great lengths to prevent the
occurrence of conditions that pose risk to them. For example, women
may undergo genetic testing to determine whether they carry the
genes linked to an 85 percent likelihood of developing breast cancer. 59
Some women who learn that they possess the genes may elect to
undergo a prophylactic double mastectomy rather than risk a breast
cancer diagnosis later in life. 60  An inaccurate test result could
therefore be devastating for an individual who undergoes such
surgery.
Also of concern is "the release of the genetic test results or
genetic materials to third parties to whom the individual never
intended to impart the information or material."61  Some genetic
testing services that market to consumers online allegedly sell their
customers' genetic information to research institutions.62 The privacy
and confidentiality issues, as well as property rights issues, associated
OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 2354 (Anthony S. Fauci et al. eds., 14th ed. 1998). Gaucher's
disease, common in Ashkenazi Jews, is an enzyme deficiency that allows fatty material to
collect in internal organs such as the liver and spleen, causing them to become enlarged.
Id. at 2174. Alzheimer's disease causes progressive dementia, and is frequently the cause of
memory loss in the elderly. Id. at 2348.
56. For example, an episode of House featured a patient threatening Dr. Wilson, an
oncologist, with a lawsuit because Dr. Wilson had incorrectly diagnosed him with cancer
three months earlier. The patient claimed that the diagnosis allowed him to live in the
present, and as a result, learning that he was not dying actually detracted from his
happiness. House: Games (FOX television broadcast Nov. 27, 2007).
57. Gabrielle Kohlmeier, The Risky Business of Lifestyle Genetic Testing: Protecting
Against Harmful Disclosure of Genetic Information, 2007 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 5, 6 (2007).
58. Id.
59. Nancy Dillon, We Survived, Too! Double Mastectomy Surgery Not Uncommon,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 20, 2008, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/lifestyle/health
/2008/08/20/2008-08-20_we survivedtoo doublemastectomy-surger- l.html.
60. Id.
61. Kohlmeier, supra note 57, at 5.
62. Id. at 26-27.
2009]
VANDERBILT J OF ENT AND TECH. LAW
with selling this information could have serious implications for the
individual as well for his family members to whom the test results
may be relevant. 63 Although the genetic testing services may inform
consumers that their genetic material or information may be sold to
third parties and used for research purposes, questions arise as to
whether individuals are aware of this practice and understand the
ramifications of consenting to this use of their genetic material.
64
Also problematic is the fact that direct-to-consumer genetic
tests, which are not FDA-regulated, are heavily marketed to
consumers. 65 However, because of the lack of assurance of these tests'
clinical validity, clinical utility, or analytic validity,66 they may
actually pose a public health hazard.67 Although the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) is authorized to regulate advertisement of direct-
to-consumer genetic tests, critics contend that the FTC has declined to
take action against these advertisements that may be false or
misleading. 6
8
63. Id. at 5. For example, an individual with Huntington's disease has a 50 percent
chance of passing on the Huntington's disease gene. 2 HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNAL MEDICINE, supra note 55, at 2354. Thus, a mother's diagnosis has implications
for her child, who may have inherited the gene. See id. A breach of confidentiality with
respect to this information, which could occur if identifying information is transmitted in
addition to the test results, could cause the child to learn information that her mother was
not ready to share.
64. Kohlmeier, supra note 57, at 27. See The Belmont Report, supra note 1
(defining "informed consent").
65. Critics of direct-to-consumer marketing of genetic tests allege that these
advertisements "(1) failo to adequately explain complex genetic information; (2) [are]
misleading in [their] failure to disclose the risks and limitations of testing; (3) allow[] tests
without established clinical validity or utility to be promoted; and (4) do[] not include the
counseling needed to put test results in proper context." Javitt, Stanley & Hudson, supra
note 36, at 253.
66. See supra note 52 (defining clinical validity, clinical utility, and analytic
validity).
67. See Jane E. Henney, Challenges in Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Advertising,
284 JAMA 2242, 2242 (2000) (describing the public health concerns that direct-to-consumer
advertising of pharmaceuticals may pose, concerns which may, by analogy, be extended to
medical devices). Consumers may make health care decisions based on inaccurate test
results, or test results which require more genetic counseling to understand than is offered
by the laboratory. Alternatively, as Henney suggests, the use of these tests may cause
tension between physicians and their patients, thus prompting consumers to seek advice
from their physicians less frequently. See id.
68. Javitt & Hudson, supra note 29, at 67. The FTC must assure that
advertisements are not false or misleading. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). The lack of enforcement




D. A New Concern
The ability of entrepreneurs to offer genetic tests on the open
market also means that consumers may use genetic testing for
purposes unrelated to their health.69 For example, a new online dating
service called Scientific Match presents a novel use for DNA collected
via a genetic test available directly to consumers 70 -matchmaking for
individuals who pay a fee and submit a DNA sample to the company's
laboratory.7 1 The company believes, based on a scientific study done
in Europe approximately a decade ago, that individuals may find their
soul mates through a system that matches people with differently
composed immune systems.
7 2
Scientific Match's concept of DNA-based matchmaking is based
on observations that women are more attracted to the scent of men
with opposite major histocompatibility complexes, a component of the
immune system.73 Individuals who register for the Scientific Match
service complete a questionnaire that provides information about their
marital status, criminal background, and personality, and submit a
DNA sample, which is forwarded to a clinical laboratory.7 4 Scientific
Match then analyzes the questionnaire responses and the DNA
samples, and matches couples based on this information.75 The
evaluation of DNA for matchmaking purposes represents a new
concept for U.S. clinical laboratories, and the existence of companies
like Scientific Match exemplifies a way in which home brew tests may
be marketed to consumers if they remain unregulated.
The FDA's refusal to regulate direct-to-consumer genetic tests
has cleared the way for these types of business enterprises in the
Internet marketplace, which means that genetic tests may now be
marketed to consumers for strictly commercial purposes rather than
for detecting diseases.7 6 Companies are more frequently offering
genetic tests that detect issues that are not medically related, since
many individuals are not only "interested in whether they have a
'predisposition' to, or elevated risk for, developing any of a number of




72. Meredith Goldstein, Love Stinks, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 2008, at G38.
73. The Scent of a Woman (and a Man), THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 2008, at 73.
74. Id.; Scientific Match, supra note 69.
75. Scientific Match, supra note 69.
76. The fact that modern genetic testing really began with prenatal testing to
detect genetic diseases or conditions in unborn fetuses indicates that the initial purpose of
genetic testing was to detect disease or diagnose an illness. See Press, supra note 5, at 73.
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major diseases" but also whether they are at risk for "more benign
social traits, such as baldness or intelligence . . .77
Although Scientific Match purports to destroy all DNA samples
after it has completed genetic testing, 78 one cannot ignore the privacy
and confidentiality risk that individuals incur by offering DNA
samples to such an enterprise. The company's website also notes that
it restricts its examination to genes related to the immune system,
and will not seek to diagnose any genetic conditions or disorders.
79
While the Scientific Match home page interestingly assures customers
that their "genetic privacy is much more vulnerable when [they] get a
haircut, or drink from a glass at a restaurant," the 'Your Privacy"
page ignores the privacy issues associated with the collection of DNA
samples and only discusses consumers' privacy as it relates to the
criminal background checks.80
The scientific merit of such a matchmaking system is outside
the scope of this Note; however, Scientific Match's unique use of DNA
raises interesting questions about the marketing, sale, and use of
direct-to-consumer genetic tests. The lack of federal oversight of
direct-to-consumer genetic tests means that such tests may easily be
used for non-scientific or questionable scientific purposes, costing
some consumers a great deal of money for very little valuable
information.81 It may furthermore affirm the general skepticism that
direct-to-consumer genetic testing "opens up a niche for bottom-
77. Bruce Patsner, Direct to Consumer Genetic Testing: Think Before You Spit,
HEALTH L. PERSPECTIVES 1, Nov. 2008, available at http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw
/perspectives/2008/(BP)%20spit.pdf.
78. Scientific Match, supra note 69.
79. See Scientific Match, The Process of Finding Your Best Matches,
http://www.scientificmatch.com/html/the process-finding chemistry.php (last visited Apr.
2, 2009).
80. Scientific Match, supra note 69; c.f. Scientific Match, Your Privacy Is Our Top
Concern, http://www.scientificmatch.com/html/your-privacy.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
This Note makes no comment on the accuracy of the statements on the Scientific Match
website. However, there is a significant difference between getting a haircut and drinking
from a glass in a restaurant, and sending a DNA sample to a laboratory for evaluation. In
the case of the haircut and the glass, individuals do not intend for their DNA to be
analyzed. The expectation is simply that the hair is discarded, and the glass is washed.
However, the intentional submission of a DNA sample for analysis, even the minimal
analysis that is performed by Scientific Match, may indeed not be less risky than as
promised because the specimen is being evaluated along with specimens from other
individuals, and some record of this analysis is made, even if the sample itself is ultimately
destroyed.
81. This quandary may be just as much of a public health hazard as potentially
unreliable test results that report a diagnosis of a fatal condition. For instance, if the
laboratory test that the Scientific Match laboratory uses to examine an individual's major
histocompatibility complex is potentially flawed, this service becomes not much different
from Match.com or any number of other dating websites-but comes at a much higher cost.
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feeding companies to terrify hypochondriacs by turning dubious
probabilities into Genes of Doom."
8 2
E. The Power of the FDA
The FDA is the agency with the best legal authority and
oversight capabilities to ensure the safety and efficacy of direct-to-
consumer genetic tests.8 3 The FDA's "technical demands, review
procedures, and scientific quality make U.S. pharmaceutical
regulation one of the world's most stringent regimes,"8 4 and it is
reasonable to believe that the same holds true for the FDA's
procedures regulating medical devices.
Admittedly, FDA regulation of genetic tests is not a flawless
system for ensuring their quality and reliability.8 5 In recent years, the
FDA's regulatory process has been the target of criticism during
litigation regarding the safety of approved devices such as the
Medtronic defibrillator and the Thoratec heart pump.8 6 The FDA has
82. Pinker, supra note 23, at 26.
83. See Anny Huang, FDA Regulation of Genetic Testing: Institutional Reluctance
and Public Guardianship, 53 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 555, 591 (1998) (concluding that the FDA
has the jurisdiction and expertise to regulate direct-to-consumer genetic tests, and that the
FDA needs "not so much legislative authorization as a social and political mandate").
84. Carl Tobias, U.S. Food and Drug Regulation in Its First Century and Beyond,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1008 (2008).
85. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for
Prescription Drugs: The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76, 104 (1994) ("[T]he FDA has experienced increasing difficulties
related to understaffing and underfunding"); Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 17, at 1274
("[Tihe FDA is not a perfect agency .. "). The Government Accountability Office has also
said that 'it is imperative that F.D.A. take immediate steps' to fix its system for approving
devices." Gardiner Harris, Report Criticizes F.D.A. on Device Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/washington16device.html?_r=l&scp=l&sq
=fda%20gao&st-cse. Nonetheless, the FDA remains the agency in the best position to
regulate genetic tests, including those available directly to consumers. See infra Section IV.
86. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 999 (2008) (holding that the FDA pre-
market approval process establishes federal requirements for medical device review and
that common law claims of strict liability, negligence, and implied warranty against
Medtronic for a catheter that malfunctioned during the plaintiffs husband's angioplasty
were pre-empted); Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3rd Cir. 2004) (holding, at the
conclusion of a trial in which a woman claimed that Thoratec's heart pump was defective
and caused her husband's death, that the FDA pre-market approval pre-empts state
common law tort claims). Numerous FDA-approved drugs, such as Fen-phen and Vioxx,
have also been removed from the market due to the risks that they posed, so one should
question whether the FDA's approval process for both devices and drugs serves to protect
the public. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Announces Withdrawal of
Fenfluramine and Dexfenfluramine, http://www.fda.gov/CDERnews/phen
/fenphenpr8l597.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009); U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
Merck Withdraws Vioxx, FDA Issues Public Health Advisory, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE,
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also been criticized for delaying the commercialization of medical
devices, and for preventing some devices from entering the market
entirely.87 However, recent support from politicians, academics, and
lobbyists for FDA regulation of genetic tests suggests that confidence
in the FDA review process still exists.88 A closer look at FDA
regulation of medical devices is warranted to better understand why
the agency's regulations are the best mechanism for ensuring the
safety and efficacy of direct-to-consumer genetic tests.
III. FDA OVERSIGHT OF MEDICAL DEVICES
Medical devices are regulated in accordance with the FDCA
and corresponding federal regulations which prescribe the
manufacturing, marketing, and monitoring requirements of all
medical devices in commercial distribution.8 9 The Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 amended the FDCA to give the FDA "express
authority to regulate the safety and effectiveness of medical devices."90
The FDA regulates medical devices according to the level of risk that
they pose to individuals, utilizing a classification system which
identifies the level of regulatory oversight to which a device is subject
in order to ensure the safety and efficacy of the device. 91  The
classification of the device determines the type of FDA application,
review, and approval process that the device must undergo before it
may be marketed.
92
Class I medical devices are only subject to general controls due
to the low risk level that these devices pose,93 whereas Class II and III
devices are subject to more stringent controls, which are discussed
below.94 Class II devices generally pose more risk than Class I
Nov.-Dec. 2004, http:/lwww.fda.gov/fdac/features/2004/604_vioxx.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2009).
87. Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical
Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1753-54 (1996).
88. See GAIL JAVITT, IN VITRO DIAGNOSTIC MULTIVARIATE INDEX ASSAYS: PUBLIC
MEETING 2 (2007), http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/InVitroDiagnosticMultivariate
_Index_.Assays.GJTestimony.pdf. See also infra text accompanying notes 164-168
(discussing recent legislation pertaining to FDA regulation of genetic testing).
89. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 800-1299.
90. Javitt, supra note 25, at 618.
91. Classify Your Medical Device, supra note 16.
92. Id.
93. See infra notes 99-100 (discussing the low risk associated with Class I devices).
Surgeon's gloves and bedpans are examples of Class I devices. Charles J. Walsh & Alissa
Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices:
Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 919 (1996).
94. See supra notes 120-160 (discussing FDA regulation of Class II and III devices).
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devices, and are thus subject to additional oversight by the FDA.95 A
medical device may be classified as a Class III device, however, if
insufficient information exists to demonstrate that general or special
controls will provide reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness of the device and the device is to be used in supporting or
sustaining human life. 96  A device may also receive Class III
classification if the device may present an unreasonable risk of illness
or injury to its user.97
A. General Controls
All medical devices, regardless of their classification, may be
subject to "general controls," a relatively low level of oversight and
control. 98 The FDA has concluded that Class I devices are not
"purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining
human life"99 and do not "present a potential unreasonable risk of
illness or injury."100 General controls may include: (1) "establishment
registration" of device manufacturers, which involves notifying the
FDA of the location of medical device manufacturing facilities and
importers; (2) provision of a medical device listing which lists all of the
devices that a manufacturer has in commercial distribution; (3)
compliance with good manufacturing practice (GMP) requirements; (4)
compliance with labeling requirements; and (5) pre-market
notification to the FDA of the intent to market a device. 01 However,
95. See infra notes 120-121 (describing special controls to which Class II devices are
subject). Class II devices include tampons and condoms. Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 91, at
919.
96. 21 U.S.C.S. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2009). Class III devices include replacement heart
valves. Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 93, at 919.
97. Id. The FDA requires that device manufacturers submit a pre-market approval
(PMA) application, described infra text accompanying notes 141-155, for most Class III
devices due to the level of risk associated with these devices because general controls,
special controls, and the 510(k) process, described infra text accompanying notes 123-138,
are insufficient to assure the safety and effectiveness of these devices. Device Classes,
supra note 19. However, Class III devices that are introduced into the U.S. market after
May 28, 1976, that are substantially equivalent to devices that were introduced into the
market prior to that date, and for which federal regulations do not specifically require a
PMA application, may be marketed following 510(k) clearance. Id.
98. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, General Controls for Medical Devices,
http://www.fda.gov/CDRHIDEVADVICE/363.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
99. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (2009).
100. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii)(II) (2009).
101. Device Classes, supra note 19. See 21 C.F.R. § 801 (2009) (pertaining to medical
device labeling); 21 C.F.R. § 807.20-39 (2009) (pertaining to establishment registration); 21
C.F.R. § 820 (2009) (pertaining to GMP requirements); 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.81-100 (2009)
(pertaining to pre-market notification).
2009]
VANDERBILT J OF ENT AND TECH. LAW
most Class I devices are exempt from GMP requirements and pre-
market notification due to the uncomplicated nature of devices




Compliance with GMP requirements ensures that the devices
are consistently produced according to the stated specifications.10 3 All
medical devices, regardless of their classification, are subject to GMP
requirements unless otherwise exempt. 104 GMP requirements are
contained in regulations that have been promulgated in accordance
with the FDA's authority under the FDCA.10 5 These regulations
require that domestic or foreign medical device manufacturers have "a
quality system for the design, manufacture, packaging, labeling,
storage, installation, and servicing of finished medical devices." 106
GMP requirements are an important general control for devices that
must undergo the 510(k) 10 7 or pre-market approval (PMA) process, 108
especially while they are in the early production phase. 0 9 This is
because the FDA makes decisions regarding the safety and efficacy of
a device based on its specifications listed in the 510(k) or PIA
application." 0
2. Label Requirements
All FDA-regulated medical devices are subject to the agency's
regulations regarding device labeling. 1 ' Promulgated regulations
address general device labeling," 2  as well as the labeling
102. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Medical Device Exemptions 510(k) and
GMP Requirements, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpcd/315.cfm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2009).
103. Ronald M. Johnson, GMPs and the Product Review Process, 48 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 299, 299 (1993).
104. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Good Manufacturing Practices
(GMP)/Quality System (QS) Regulation, http://www.fda.gov/CDRH/DEVADVICE/32.html
(last visited Apr. 2, 2009), for more information about GMP regulations and exemptions.
105. See 21 C.F.R. § 820 (2009).
106. Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP)/Quality System (QS) Regulation, supra
note 104.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 123-38 (discussing the 510(k) process).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 141-55.
109. Johnson, supra note 103, at 299.
110. Id.
111. See infra notes 111-119 (discussing FDA labeling requirements for medical
devices).
112. 21 C.F.R. § 801 (2009).
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requirements for in vitro diagnostic devices. 113 The FDA has also
established labeling regulations through its GMP regulations, which
are relevant to genetic tests. 114
A "label" is written, printed, or graphic material on the
container of a device, and "labeling" refers to all labels or other
written, printed, or graphic material on the device or any of its
containers, or accompanying the device. 115 As regulated devices, test
kits must comply with the appropriate labeling requirements for
medical devices.11 6  However, the labeling of direct-to-consumer
genetic tests remains unregulated. 117  Thus, the content of any
materials printed on or included with such a home brew test is created
by the manufacturer without meaningful federal oversight.
If the FDA were to regulate all direct-to-consumer genetic
tests, manufacturers would have to comply with relevant labeling
regulations, which would likely alleviate the possibility that
manufacturers will engage in potentially false or misleading
advertising of these tests.118  Furthermore, although the FDA's
labeling requirements exist separate and apart from any advertising
requirements that the FTC may impose with respect to direct-to-
consumer genetic tests, perhaps the FTC will be more inclined to
enforce its regulations if the FDA imposes regulations on the tests.11 9
B. Special Controls
Class II medical devices are subject to more oversight and
control than Class I devices through the use of special controls
because the "general controls by themselves are insufficient to provide
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device." 120
113. See 21 C.F.R. § 809.10-809.11 (2009).
114. See 21 C.F.R. § 820.120. See also supra text accompanying notes 103-106 for a
discussion of GMP regulations.
115. 21 U.S.C. § 321(k) & (in) (2009) (defining "label" and "labeling," definitions that
apply to all food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics regulated under the FDCA).
116. See Kathy Hudson et al., ASHG Statement on Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing in the United States, 81 Am. J. HUM. GENETICS 635, 636 (2007) ("[T]he FDA reviews
the ... labeling of commercial test kits before they are marketed.").
117. See id.
118. See U.S. v. Research Labs., 126 F.2d 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1942) ('most, if not all
labeling is advertising. The term 'labeling' is defined in the [FD CA] as including all printed
matter accompanying any article. Congress did not, and we cannot, exclude from the
definition printed matter which constitutes advertising.").
119. See supra text accompanying note 68 (discussing FTC regulation of
advertisements).
120. 21 U.S.C.S. § 360c(a)(1)(B). Class I devices are not subject to special controls
because of their low risk level, and Class III medical devices are not subject to special
2009]
VANDERBILTJ. OFENT. AND TECH. LAW
These special controls may include special labeling requirements,
mandatory performance standards, and post-market surveillance. 121
C. Pre-Market Notification
Class II devices are also subject to the pre-market notification
requirement. While some Class II devices are exempt from the pre-
market notification process, more Class I devices than Class II devices
qualify for exemption. 122  Through this pre-market notification
process, also referred to as the 510(k) process, the FDA must
determine whether a device is safe and effective for its intended use,
and thus may be marketed and sold to the public. 123
The 510(k) process derives its name from the original section of
the FDCA that pertained to pre-market notification. 124 Manufacturers
of Class I and II medical devices that are not exempt from the pre-
market notification process submit a 510(k) application to the FDA
ninety or more days prior to introducing the device into commercial
distribution. 125  The 510(k) process requires manufacturers to
demonstrate that their new medical device is "substantially
equivalent" to a medical device currently on the market, called a
"predicate."'126 A device is substantially equivalent if it has the same
intended use as another legally marketed device and uses the same
controls because the FDA has deemed these controls inadequate for assuring their safety
and effectiveness. See Device Classes, supra note 19.
121. Device Classes, supra note 19.
122. The FDCA authorizes the FDA to exempt certain types of medical devices from
the pre-market notification process. 21 U.S.C.S. § 360c(c)(2)(B). More than 800 types of
Class I devices are exempt from the pre-market notification process, while 60 Class II
devices are exempt from pre-market notification. U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
Class I/1I Exemptions, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/3133.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2009). However, while many Class I devices are exempt from compliance with GMP
requirements, no Class II device is so exempt. Medical Device Exemptions 510(k) and GMP
Requirements, supra note 102.
123. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Premarket Notification 510(k),
http://www.fda.gov/CDRH/DEVADVICE/314.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
124. Michael VanBuren, Note, Closing the Loopholes in the Regulation of Medical
Devices: The Need for Congress to Reevaluate Medical Device Regulation, 17 HEALTH
MATRIX: J. OF L.-MED. 441, 448 (2007).
125. Id.; Device Classes, supra note 19.
126. Premarket Notification 510(k), supra note 123. If the FDA determines that no
substantial equivalent for a new device currently exists on the market, the FDA issues a
"not substantially equivalent" letter to the manufacturer, and the device receives a Class
III designation. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 510(k) Special Considerations,
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/314c.html#denovo (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). Within 30
days of receipt of such a letter, manufacturers of low-risk devices may request a de novo
classification of the device into Class I or II. Id.
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technology as that device. 127 If the new device has the same intended
use as another legally marketed device but it uses a different
technology, the new device is substantially equivalent to the old one if
the manufacturer can demonstrate that this alternate technology is as
safe and effective as the legally marketed device. 128
Review of a 510(k) is based on the FDA's evaluation of
characteristics of the new device compared to its predicate. 129 Such
characteristics include "the bias or inaccuracy of the new device, the
imprecision of the new device, and the analytical specificity and
sensitivity" of the new device.1 30 If the FDA determines that the new
device is substantially equivalent to the predicate device, the agency
will issue an order clearing the device for commercial distribution.13 1
In 2007 the FDA committed to reviewing 90 percent of 510(k)
applications submitted to the agency within 90 days and 98 percent
within 150 days.
132
The FDA may only request limited amounts of information
from manufacturers regarding the substantial equivalence of a new
device to a legally marketed device that uses different technology.
1 33
The Department of Health and Human Services may only request
information that is "necessary to making substantial equivalence
determination [s]" and must "consider the least burdensome means of
demonstrating substantial equivalence."1 34  As a result, many
manufacturers submit only pre-clinical data, obtained from animals,1 35
and not clinical data obtained from clinical trials with human
subjects.136
127. 510(k) Special Considerations, supra note 126.
128. Id.
129. Premarket Notification 510(k), supra note 123.
130. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Overview of IVD Regulation,
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/oivd/regulatory-overview.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
131. Id. Medical devices cleared through the 510(k) process are not "FDA-approved."
The term "clearance," rather than "approval" is used because the 510(k) process is just a
finding of substantial equivalence, and not necessarily safety and effectiveness. Edward M.
Basile, Ellen Armentrout & Kelly N. Reeves, Medical Device Labeling and Advertising: An
Overview, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 519, 524 n.50 (1999).
132. Letter from Michael Leavitt, Sec'y of the Dep't of Health and Human Servs., to
Sen. Edward Kennedy (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/MDUFMA
/commitmentletter.pdf.
133. VanBuren, supra note 124, at 453-54.
134. Id. at 454 (citing 21 U.S.C.S. § 360c(i)(1)(D) (2009)).
135. The FDA defines pre-clinical laboratory data as "results of testing... done in
laboratory animals .. " U.S. Food and Drug Administration, A Guide to Drug Safety
Terms, at 1, available at http://www.fda.gov/consumer/updates/drugterms041l08.pdf.
136. VanBuren, supra note 124, at 454. Class III devices, however, must undergo
clinical trials with human subjects prior to commercial distribution. 21 C.F.R. §
814.20(b)(3)(v)(B) (2009).
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Although the 510(k) process is less time consuming and the
application is shorter than other FDA review processes for medical
devices, 137 the 510(k) process should be used to ensure the safety and
efficacy of genetic tests sold directly to consumers. Class II devices
that are not exempt from pre-market notification need not necessarily
undergo a lengthier, more expensive review than the 510(k) process if
a substantial equivalent already exists, which is likely in the case of
genetic testing.1 38 Furthermore, the FDA's 2007 guidance document
addressing regulation of in vitro diagnostic multivariate index assays
(IVDMIAs), 139 indicates that Class II, and in some cases Class III,
designation is appropriate. 140 Thus, a Class I designation seems both
unlikely, given the FDA's past actions, and imprudent, given the
public health implications and risks associated with these tests.
D. The Pre-Market Approval (PMA) Process
It would also be possible to classify direct-to-consumer genetic
tests as Class III devices, but a Class III designation may not be
appropriate or necessary for all of these devices. Because there is
more uncertainty regarding the risk of Class III devices,
manufacturers of a Class III device must submit a PMA application
and await the FDA's approval prior to marketing the device.141 Due to
the unknown or high level of risk associated with Class III devices, the
PMA process is more onerous than the 510(k) application process. 142
137. C.f. supra text accompanying note 132 with infra text accompanying note 148
(comparing the length of time it takes for the FDA to review a 510(k) application and a
PMA application). See also infra note 141 (discussing the typical length of a 510(k)
application and a PMA application).
138. See supra notes 126-131 (describing substantial equivalence).
139. See supra note 41 (discussing IVDMIAs).
140. Garcia, supra note 48, at 223.
141. Devices on the market prior to the passage of the Medical Device Amendments
in 1976 are not subject to PMA approval. Device Classes, supra note 19. Instead,
companies wishing to market such devices may submit a 510(k). Id. This exception is likely
to be inapplicable to genetic tests because the first genetic test was approved in 1976. See
Press, supra note 5, at 73.
142. Compare U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Device Advice, Application
Contents, http://www.fda.gov/CDRH/DEVADVICE/pma/app-contents.html (last visited
Apr. 2, 2009) (detailing the elements of the PMA application process) with U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, Device Advice, How to Prepare a Traditional 510(k) Application,
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/3143.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) (listing the
required content of a 510(k) application). PMA applications are typically more than 1,000
pages long, while 510(k) applications are, on average, less than ten pages. Richard C.
Ausness, 'After You My Dear Alphonse!": Should the Courts Defer to the FDA's New
Interpretation of a § 360(K)(A) of the Medical Device Amendments?, 80 TULANE L. REV. 727,
765 (2006); Lawrence S. Makow, Medical Device Review at the Food and Drug
Administration: Lessons from Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy and Biliary Lithotripsy, 46
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1. The PMA Application
PMA applications are very detailed and must include specific
information about the device. 143  The PMA application must (1)
summarize the disease or condition that the device will diagnose,
treat, or prevent, as well as the population for whom the device is
intended;144 (2) summarize how the device functions, any alternative
practices or procedures for diagnosing, treating, or preventing the
disease or condition for which the device is intended, and any
marketing history of the device;1 45 and (3) summarize any non-clinical
laboratory studies conducted, as well as clinical investigations
involving human subjects, and the results of such studies. 146  PMA
approval hinges upon the FDA finding that "sufficient valid scientific
evidence" exists that demonstrates the safety and effectiveness of the
device.1 47 FDA regulations require the agency to review a PMA
application within 180 days of receiving it from a manufacturer. 148
2. Institutional Review Boards and Clinical Investigations
Class III devices undergoing the PMA process are subject not
only to the FDA's scrutiny but also to the scrutiny of an institutional
review board (IRB) during the course of the required clinical
investigations.1 49 Federal law requires institutions conducting clinical
research involving human subjects to maintain an IRB-a committee
charged with protecting human research subjects by evaluating
prospective research protocols to ensure that they are consistent with
STAN. L. REV. 709, 713 n.23 (1994). Class III devices, which are substantially equivalent to
devices legally marketed prior to mid-1976, as well as devices that are not specifically
required by regulation to undergo the PMA process, may be marketed through the 510(k)
process. Device Classes, supra note 19.
143. 21 C.F.R. § 814.42(b) (2009).
144. 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(3)(i) (2009).
145. 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(3)(ii) - (iv) (2009).
146. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(3)(v) (2009). Unlike a 510(k) application, a PMA
application may not include only the results of pre-clinical studies. Id. Instead, there is an
expectation that Class III devices undergo clinical trial testing with human subjects whose
results will be reported in the PMA application. 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(3)(v)(B) (2009).
147. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Premarket Approval (PMA), Overview,
available at, http://www.fda.gov/cdrhldevadvice/pma/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
148. 21 C.F.R. § 814.42(b) (2009). However, in 2002, the average review time for a
PMA application was 213 days, and in 2003, the average review time was 221 days.
Gregory J. Scandaglia & Therese L. Tully, Express Preemption and Premarket Approval
Under the Medical Device Amendments, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 252 (2004).
149. 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(3)(v)(2009).
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basic ethical principles. 150 The IRB's fundamental objective is to
protect the health and welfare of the human subjects who ultimately
enroll in clinical trials. 15' Researchers planning to test a new medical
device must submit a protocol to the IRB to explain how they plan to
test the device. The IRB reviews the protocol and requires that
necessary changes be made to the protocol, such as its methodology,
recruitment strategy, or informed consent process, based on criteria
established by federal regulation. 5 2 Furthermore, IRBs must review
and approve any changes made to a research protocol both before and
after the committee approves it, ensuring that every aspect of the
clinical trial is scrutinized.
53
3. The Benefits of the PMA process
The combination of the lengthy PMA review period and the
IRB review process would likely ensure the safety and efficacy of a
direct-to-consumer genetic test warranting a Class III classification.
154
However, due to the rigorous nature of the PMA application for device
150. See 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2009). Researchers not affiliated with an institution that
has established its own IRB can request IRB review from a commercial IRB, which charges
a fee for its review services. See, e.g., New England IRB, http://www.neirb.com (last visited
Apr. 2, 2009). It is worth noting that FDA regulations govern IRB review of any protocols
involving investigational drugs and devices. 21 C.F.R. § 56 (2009). Thus, the FDA's Center
for Devices and Radiological Health oversees the FDA review of new medical devices, and
the FDA's Office for Human Research Trials oversees the review of new medical devices
during the clinical trial process.
151. See 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2009). Inhumane treatment of concentration camp prisoners
under the guise of medical research conducted by Nazi scientists during WWII, the
Tuskegee syphilis experiments, and other abuses of human subjects in research have led to
the promulgation of these regulations regarding the conduct of the IRB and the conduct of
research with human subjects. William H. Schneider, History of IRB,
http://www.iupui.edu/-histwhs/G504.dir/irbhist.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
152. See 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2009).
153. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b)(3) (2009); 45 C.F.R. § 46.110(b)(2) (2009).
154. Some may argue that many IRBs do not have the required expertise to review
genetic test protocols adequately. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH
AND SOCIAL POLICY 13 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds. 1994), available at
http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record-id=2057#toc. However, IRBs consist of a panel of
at least five experts who have varying backgrounds, which helps to assure the "complete
and adequate review" of research activities at the institution. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (2009).
The committee must have a variety of expertise and experience, as well as individuals from
diverse cultures who have varying sensitivities to community attitudes, and at least one
member whose area of expertise is non-scientific. Id. Furthermore, IRBs may "invite
individuals with competence in special areas to assist in the review of issues which require
expertise beyond or in addition to that available on the IRB." 45 C.F.R. § 46.107() (2009).
The varying expertise of the members of the committee as well as the IRB's ability to
utilize consultants with specific expertise should it not already have adequate expertise on




manufacturers, a proposal to regulate all genetic tests as Class III
devices seems both unrealistic and unwarranted given the risks
associated with many of these tests. The low risk of the genetic tests
does not generally require such scrutiny, and thus, subjecting these
devices to the PMA process would be inefficient. Furthermore, clinical
research results demonstrating the safety and efficacy of genetic tests
designed to locate predictors of a future disease or condition could take
years to obtain, further delaying a test manufacturer's ability to
submit a PMA application.
155
E. Post-Market Surveillance
The FDA's oversight of medical devices that are already in
commercial distribution provides additional assurance of the
continuing safety and efficacy of medical devices, and would effectively
monitor the clinical validity, clinical utility, and analytic validity of
direct-to-consumer genetic tests. 156  MedWatch, the FDA's safety
information and adverse event reporting program, 157  reports
information to the FDA from manufacturers and distributors of
medical devices regarding safety or other problems with their products
and posts important updates on the MedWatch website.
158
Manufacturers of Class III devices must submit annual reports
to the FDA that disclose all changes in how the device is
manufactured, any adverse events that have occurred in any clinical
studies, and any other information that supports the continued safety
and efficacy of the device. 159 Class I and II devices are also subject to
annual reporting requirements, though less information is required to
be submitted to the FDA than is required for Class III devices.
160
Thus, FDA-regulated direct-to-consumer genetic tests would have to
comply with relevant post-market approval regulations.
155. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY,
supra note 154, at 14.
156. See supra text accompanying supra note 52 (discussing clinical validity, clinical
utility, and analytic validity, and the importance of assuring each of these with respect to
genetic tests).
157. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, MedWatch, www.fda.gov/medwatch
(last visited Feb. 20, 2009). See also Jeffrey Zigler, John Walsh & Jack Zigler, Medical
Device Reporting: Issues with Class III Medical Devices, 62 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 573, 575.
158. Id. at 575.
159. Id. at 576.
160. Id. at 577.
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IV. FDA REGULATION IS THE BEST SOLUTION
Classification of direct-to-consumer genetic tests as Class II or
III devices when the risk level of the test deems such a classification
to be necessary is ultimately the most appropriate means of assuring
that the FDA subjects these tests to sufficient oversight without
unnecessary burden. Such a conclusion is consistent with recently
proposed legislation, and would ensure that these tests undergo, at a
minimum, the FDA's 510(k) review process, but would not
automatically impose a PMA application requirement. 161
Pre-market notification and PMA approval would be costly,
both in terms of time and money for the clinical laboratories that sell
these tests. 16 2 However, the benefits that FDA oversight over the
marketing and sale of these tests offer outweigh these costs because
they help to ensure the safety and effectiveness of these tests that
could pose a public health hazard if left unregulated. 163 Furthermore,
the costs are not a reasonable justification for leaving tests
unregulated that may pose a public health hazard.
Indeed, members of Congress have made several attempts to
enact legislation that would require the FDA to regulate direct-to-
consumer genetic tests. In 2006, and again in 2007, then-Senator
Barack Obama proposed legislation called the Genomics and
Personalized Medicine Act which would have required additional
federal oversight over direct-to-consumer marketing of genetic tests.
164
The bill specifically provided that the director of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention "conduct an analysis of the public
health impact of direct-to-consumer marketing; . . . analyze the
validity of claims made in direct-to-consumer marketing; and make
recommendations to Congress ... to protect the public from potential
harms of direct-to-consumer marketing .... ."165 In March 2007
Senators Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Gordon Smith (R-OR)
161. See supra text accompanying notes 124-160 for a discussion of the 510(k) and
PMA application process.
162. See supra text accompanying note 132 (noting average review time for a 510(k)
application), 135 (noting the average review time for a PMA application). See also U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, PMA Review Fees, http://www.fda.gov/CDRH
/DEVADVICE/pma/userfees.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) (listing the fees for submitting
a PMA and 510(k) application).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 98-1630 (discussing the FDA's regulatory
process for medical devices that ultimately helps to ensure the public's health and welfare).
164. Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act, S. 3822, 109th Cong. (2006);
Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act, S. 976, 110th Cong. (2007). In July 2008,
Representative Patrick Kennedy revised Obama's 2007 legislation, though Congress never
voted on it. Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act, H.R. 6498, 110th Cong. (2008).
165. S. 3822, § 7(45N)(e)(1).
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proposed a series of amendments to the FDCA that would have
required the FDA to regulate all laboratory-developed tests as medical
devices, which would include direct-to-consumer genetic tests.
1 66
Under this bipartisan legislation, called the Laboratory Test
Improvement Act, most laboratory tests would have been required to
be classified as Class II devices. 167 The bill would have also required
that all manufacturers of laboratory-developed tests provide the FDA
with information regarding the analytic and clinical validity of the
tests. 168 Neither of the proposed bills was enacted; however, they
indicate that Congress may be moving toward imposing a requirement
that the FDA regulate direct-to-consumer genetic tests.
Despite this advocacy from Congress, opponents of FDA
regulation of direct-to-consumer genetic tests argue that these tests
are in fact clinical laboratory services and not medical devices, and
should therefore not be regulated as devices by the FDA.169 In
February 2007 the FDA's Center for Devices and Radiological Health
convened a public meeting to discuss the proposed guidelines for
regulation of IVDMIAs. 170 At the meeting, manufacturers of direct-to-
consumer genetic tests contested these proposed guidelines as too
confusing, and said that they provided a "disincentive to
innovation."'171 They even argued that the FDA may not have the
authority to regulate direct-to-consumer genetic tests as medical
devices. 172 However, a challenge of the FDA's power to regulate
direct-to-consumer genetic tests seems unlikely to result in a decision
that would render the FDA unable to regulate these tests, as courts
generally defer to an agency's interpretation of its statutory mandate
unless the interpretation is arbitrary and capricious. 173
166. Laboratory Test Improvement Act, S. 736, § 3 (2007).
167. S. 736, § 5(a)(4)(A).
168. S. 736, § 4(d)(3)(A)(1).
169. Denise Caruso, Genetic Tests Offer Promise, But Raise Questions, Too, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 18, 2007, at C5, cited in Gniady, supra note 21, at 2464; Juliana Han, The
Optimal Scope of FDA Regulation of Genetic Tests: Meeting Challenges and Keeping
Promises, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 423, 431 (2007).
170. Caruso, supra note 169, cited in Gniady, supra note 21, at 2464. See also supra
note 41 (discussing IVDMIAs).
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also Han, supra note 169, at 431.
173. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Although in FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), the Supreme Court held that the
FDA did not have the power to regulate tobacco as a drug, the decision was made primarily
based on the fact that Congress had enacted a number of tobacco-specific laws, and that the
FDA had never exercised any control over tobacco. Id. Thus, the court concluded that
Congress did not intend to delegate authority to the FDA to regulate tobacco. Id. In the
case of direct-to-consumer genetic tests, Congress has enacted no legislation related to this
technology, so the Brown & Williamson rationale is not likely to apply here. Furthermore,
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A. Alternatives to FDA Regulation
One alternative to FDA regulation of direct-to-consumer
genetic tests is exclusive regulation under the Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), 174 but this is likely to be
an insufficient solution.175 CLIA regulations, which govern all clinical
laboratories in the United States, are administered and enforced
through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), an
office within the Department of Health and Human Services. 176 CLIA
imposes quality standards on clinical laboratories regarding the tests
that they use to "ensure the accuracy, reliability, and timeliness of
patient test results,"177 and also imposes standards for the types of
personnel and qualifications of personnel that clinical laboratories
employ.178 While CLIA regulations "govern protocols and reagents
used in genetic tests by laboratories providing clinical testing
services," 179 no specific CLIA regulations govern genetic testing as a
separate category of tests.180  In 2000, the Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Advisory Committee (CLIAC) published a notice of
intent, proposing amendments to CLIA that would create a specific
genetic testing section in the regulations. 81 However, CLIA was
never amended as proposed.182
CLIA regulation of direct-to-consumer genetic testing is a more
viable alternative to FDA regulation of these tests than any of the
other alternatives mentioned in this Note because of the CLIA
regulatory scheme governing laboratory testing and personnel.
However, CLIA regulation is ultimately an inadequate solution to the
problems associated with direct-to-consumer genetic testing because
too many CLIA-certified laboratories are in need of oversight, and
CLIA is "marred by reporting deficiencies and laboratory inspections
it seems as though it would be a difficult battle to show that, when enacting regulations
governing the marketing and sale of direct-to-consumer genetic tests, the FDA is acting
arbitrarily and capriciously given its current oversight over genetic test kits.
174. See 42 C.F.R. § 493 (2009).
175. Michael J. Malinowski, Separating Predictive Genetic Testing From Snake Oil:
Regulation, Liabilities, and Lost Opportunities, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 23, 42 (2000).
176. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Overview of Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments (CLIA), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/clial (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
177. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, CLIA - Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments, http://www.fda.gov/CDRH/clia/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
178. Who Regulates Genetic Tests?, supra note 41.
179. Gniady, supra note 21, at 2439.
180. Id. at 2440.
181. Garcia, supra note 48, at 220.
182. Id. at 220.
[Vol. 11:3:711
OVER THE COUNTER
that are infrequent and insufficient." 18 3 Thus, CLIA cannot reliably
assure the quality of the laboratories themselves, and as a result,
certainly cannot reliably assure the quality of the tests.
18 4
Furthermore, CLIA cannot guarantee that laboratories provide
counseling services with their genetic tests because CLIA only
regulates the tests themselves and not any accompanying services.18 5
For this same reason, CLIA cannot regulate laboratory compliance
with informed consent and confidentiality requirements associated
with the sale of genetic tests directly to consumers.
18 6
Also complicating the ability of CLIA to adequately regulate
direct-to-consumer genetic testing is the fact that CLIA currently
requires laboratories to assure only the analytic validity, and not the
clinical validity and utility, of tests.187 A major reason for advocating
for federal regulation of direct-to-consumer genetic tests is to ensure
the analytic validity, as well as the clinical validity and utility, of
these tests.1
88
Another alternative to FDA regulation of direct-to-consumer
genetic tests is to remove these tests from the market altogether and
require that all genetic testing be done through a health care
provider.189 Such a solution, however, violates the spirit of autonomy
that individuals value as part of their health care decisions.1 90 It is
also wasteful of the technology that is available and in demand, which
could be, with proper monitoring, accurate and useful.1 91 Eliminating
these tests from the marketplace entirely would also prevent
individuals from taking advantage of the benefits of direct-to-
consumer genetic testing. These benefits include, for example, the
183. Malinowski, supra note 175, at 42.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. Id. Issues such as informed consent, confidentiality, and counseling are
"complicated patient care issues," and are really unrelated to laboratory quality assurance
under the purpose of CLIA. Id.
187. Neil A. Holtzman, FDA and the Regulation of Genetic Tests, 41 JURIMETRICS J.
53, 57 (2000). A major reason that direct-to-consumer genetic tests should be federally
regulated is to assure the clinical validity and utility of these tests. See supra text
accompanying note 50. CLIA would have to be amended to require assurance of clinical
validity and utility of laboratory tests, and "the surveyors [who assure compliance] are not
trained to assess clinical validity and utility ... and have their hands full assessing each
laboratory's analytic validity and its other efforts to assure quality." Holtzman, supra, at
57. See supra note 52 (defining clinical validity and clinical utility).
188. See supra text accompanying note 52 (discussing analytic validity, clinical
validity, and clinical utility).
189. See Gniady, supra note 21, at 2455-57, 2470.
190. See id. at 2470.
191. See id.
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ability of an individual to test for particular diseases or conditions in
the privacy of his own home, and the ability to learn of these test
results without the risk that the information will be included in a
medical record, potentially resulting in insurance discrimination.
192
A third alternative would be state regulation. Some states
currently prohibit the sale of direct-to-consumer tests, which includes
direct-to-consumer genetic tests. 193  However, these states have
difficulty enforcing such a ban on tests that are sold through the
Internet.194 Recent statistics indicate that twenty-five states and the
District of Columbia permit all forms of direct-to-consumer testing,
while thirteen states prohibit all direct-to-consumer testing.1 95 Twelve
states permit some direct-to-consumer testing, though genetic tests
are likely not among the permissible tests. 196 This varying attitude
among states regarding the permissibility of direct-to-consumer
testing is indicative of the inconsistency with which direct-to-
consumer genetic tests would be regulated if regulation is left to the
states, rather than the federal government. Thus, state regulation of
direct-to-consumer genetic tests is not a satisfactory alternative to
FDA regulation, as inconsistent regulations would do little to ensure
the safety and effectiveness of these tests.
As an alternative to promulgating regulations governing the
marketing and sale of direct-to-consumer genetic tests, the FDA could
just publish guidance documents that would indicate to manufacturers
how the FDA prefers that these tests be made and monitored. Indeed,
the FDA has already published draft guidance that proposed that the
FDA regulate all IVDMIAs, 19' including any that are laboratory-
192. In 2008 Congress passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, which
prohibits health insurance and employment discrimination on the basis of genetic
information. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122
Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2009), 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.
(2009)). This means that health insurers may not charge an otherwise healthy individual
higher premiums based on genetic predisposition to a particular genetic disease or
condition. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act tit. 1. Furthermore, the law
prohibits employers from considering genetic information when making hiring, firing, work
assignment, promotion, or compensation decisions. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act tit. 2. The law, however, does not extend to protect against discrimination with respect
to other forms of insurance, such as life insurance, disability insurance, or long-term care
insurance. Cheryl Erwin, Legal Update: Living with the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, 10 GENETICS IN MED. 869, 871 (2008). Thus, an individual's
concern that insurance discrimination may result from the release of genetic information is
not entirely unfounded.




197. See supra note 41 (discussing FDA draft guidance for IVDMIAs).
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developed and marketed directly to consumers. However, guidance
documents, unlike regulations, do not have the force of law, and are
instead merely advisory.198 It is therefore unlikely that
manufacturers will be inclined to follow guidance documents that
advocate for lengthier and more expensive research and development,
and more stringent marketing requirements.
B. An Argument for FDA Regulation
Thus, to assure the safety and effectiveness of direct-to-
consumer genetic tests whose safety and effectiveness is not currently
assured, the FDA must promulgate regulations that subject these
tests to the same requirements as other medical devices, including
test kits. The publication of guidance documents is an insufficient
guarantee that laboratories will develop tests that comply with the
relevant regulations, 199 and regulation of these tests through CLIA is
inadequate to assure the clinical validity and utility of these tests.200
State regulation will not promote a consistent standard with which
direct-to-consumer tests must comply, as each state will inevitably
adopt different standards which will ultimately depend on the
attitudes of the legislature and constituents on the matter. 201 Such
regulations should designate most direct-to-consumer genetic tests as
Class II devices, with some designated as Class III devices where the
risk level is appropriate for such a classification. The FDA should
regulate these tests regardless of ASR production source. Specific
regulations with respect to labeling or marketing may help to assure
the quality of any content that direct-to-consumer test manufacturers
issue, including the test itself, any accompanying materials, as well as
its results.
V. CONCLUSION
The benefits of offering direct-to-consumer genetic tests to the
public likely outweigh the potential disadvantages and risks posed by
these tests.20 2 However, these benefits can only be realized if the
198. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 235 (2008).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 197-198 (discussing the insufficiency of FDA
guidance).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 174-188 (discussing CLIA as an alternative
to FDA regulation of direct-to-consumer genetic tests).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 193-196 (discussing the possibility of state
regulation of direct-to-consumer genetic tests).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17 (noting the advantages and
disadvantages of genetic tests offered directly to consumers).
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government, through the FDA, exercises its right to regulate the
marketing and sale of these genetic tests. Because these tests are
available directly to consumers without a visit to a health care
provider, genetic testing may be offered with greater convenience and
confidentiality than if doctors' visits were required.203 Furthermore,
individuals may be more likely to seek genetic testing because of such
benefits, which may lead to earlier detection and better treatment of
genetic disorders or conditions.
Without federal regulation, there exists the possibility of
consumers relying on flawed tests that deliver inaccurate results, and
acting upon results without adequate guidance as to their meaning.204
Whether through legislative mandate or on its own initiative, the FDA
should promulgate regulations governing the marketing and sale of all
genetic tests, including direct-to-consumer tests, as medical devices.
The process that the FDA requires medical devices to undergo in order
to be commercially distributed will help to ensure the analytic
validity, clinical validity, and clinical utility of these tests, and in turn
ensure the safety of the consumers who will purchase these tests.
Lauren B. Solberg*
203. See supra text accompanying note 13 (noting the convenience of such tests).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 53-64 (discussing the need for counseling to
adequately understand genetic test results).
J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, 2010; M.T.S., Harvard
University, 2003; B.A. English & Religion, University of Florida, 2001.
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